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COMMENTS
RECOVERING PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM
EMPLOYERS: THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909
When a plaintiff is injured through the wrongful conduct
of another, he may seek compensation for his loss from the
guilty party. In addition to compensatory damages, the plaintiff may seek punitive damages because of the outrageous
nature of the defendant's conduct. If punitive damages are
assessed, the plaintiff may recover, and consequently the
defendant may pay, an amount of money in excess of the actual
loss suffered. For this reason, the law of punitive damages will
be very important to both parties. If the person causing the injuries was employed and working for another at the time of the
incident, the plaintiff might also seek compensatory and
punitive damages from the employer. At this point, the law of
punitive damages will also become very important to the
employer.
The purpose of this comment is to shed some light on the
law of punitive damages as it relates to employers. The scope
of the discussion and analysis will be limited to the situation
where an employee injures a third person rather than the case
where one employee injures another employee.
There are generally two different theories upon which
punitive damages might be assessed against employers for the
injurious acts of their employees. 1 The theory providing the
easiest case for plaintiffs is that of "strict vicarious liability."
Under this theory, an employer will be held liable for punitive
damages whenever his agent, while acting within the scope of
employment, has committed an act for which punitive damages
could be assessed. 2 The other, more restrictive, theory is
reported in section 909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3
The Restatement rule limits the circumstances under which
Copyright 0 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. See generally J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE

SS5.06-5.07 (1981).
2. See generaly 5 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS S 40.51[31 (M. Minzer, J. Nates, C. Kimball, &

D. Axelrod ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Minzer].
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909 (1979). See 5 Minzer,
Published
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an employer may be liable for punitive4 damages to those in
which he has in some way participated.
The Restatement theory of liability was adopted by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in the case of Campen v. Stone.5 The
specific purpose of this comment will be to aid the Wyoming
practitioner in understanding the Restatement rule, by illustrating how other courts have applied it and by suggesting
other possible interpretations of the rule. Before reaching an
analysis of the rule, however, a brief discussion of the history
of punitive damages might be helpful in understanding the
policies underlying the doctrine.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages owe their origins to old English law and
the days when juries were considered the sole judges of
damages in a law suit. 6 When a particular wrong was attended
by aggravating circumstances, juries were likely to return
large awards against defendants.7 Courts, noting that the parties had agreed to put their case to a jury and that juries are
not supposed to give verdicts inconsistent with their conscience, would dismiss defendant's objections to awards given
in excess of actual damages."
Toward the end of the eighteenth century English courts
began taking a different view toward damages, conceding that
such awards might not always be purely compensatory in
nature. 9 Lord Chief Justice Pratt is reported to have said,
"Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, and as
a proof of the detestation in which the wrongful act is held by
the jury."' 0
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909 (1979). Section 909 allows punitive damages
against an employer where he, or his managerial gent, authorized, ratified or approved
the agent's outrageous act, or was reckless in employing or retaining the employee who
committed the act. See 5 Minzer, supra note 2, S 40.15[2], at 40-125.
5. 635 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1981).
6. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 302 (2d ed. 1912).

7. Id.

S 349, at 688 (9th ed. 1920).
9. Id. at 688-89.
10. LORD CAMPBELL, Lives of the Chancellors, VOL. v., at 249, quoted in 1 SEDGEWICK,
supra note 8, S 350, at 690.
8. SEDGEWICK, 1 A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/9

2

Barbe: Recovering Punitive Damages from Employers: The Practical Applica
673
COMMENTS

1983

The principle of awarding damages for the sake of punishment was established early in America. A New Jersey court in
the late 1700's instructed a jury not to award damages based
upon particular proof of actual loss, but rather to award
damages for "example's sake," in order to discourage similar
conduct by others.1 1 Toward the end of the 1800's the Illinois
Supreme Court stated: "In vindictive actions the jury are
always permitted to give damages for the double purpose of
setting an example and of punishing the wrongdoer." 12 This
language is a relatively accurate statement of the modern principal of punitive damages.
THE MODERN THEORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Today, many jurisdictions allow punitive damages for a
defendant's outrageous conduct, as a means of punishing and
deterring similar conduct by others. 13 The general rule followed by those jurisdictions is simple when the defendant is also
the one who committed the injurious act. Generally, punitive
damages will be awarded where the defendant's conduct is
found to be aggravated or outrageous. 14 Where the party
against whom punitive damages are sought did not himself
commit the injurious act, but rather is only an employer of the
one who did, the rule for assessing punitive damages may be
slightly different.
THE VIcARIOus LIABILITY RULE

Some jurisdictions follow a rule of strict vicarious liability
in suits where punitive damages are sought against employers
for the outrageous acts of their employees.1 5 In those jurisdictions, the outrageous conduct of an employee acting within the
scope of his employment will be imputed to the employer, making him liable for punitive damages whether or not he author11. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 Coxe 90, 91 (N.J. 1791).
(3 Scam.) 372, 373, 374 (1842), quoted in 1 SEDGEWICK, supra
12. Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill.
note 8, S 352, at 697.
13. 5 Minzer, supra note 2, J 40.10. Not all jurisdictions, however, allow plaintiffs to recover
punitive damages. Id. at S 40.02. Some of the objections to the doctrine are that it allows
defendants to be punished without having the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that juries who are untrained in determining the amount of punishment that is proper
often assess the damage at an amount far greater than any punishment that might be
criminally imposed for the same act. 1 SEDGEWICK, supra note 8, S 353, 699.
14. 5 Minzer, supra note 2,

S 40.20.

15. See, e.g., Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975).
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ized the act. 16 The rationale of this rule is that when an
employer vests in his agent authority to act on his behalf, all of
the acts done within the scope of employment are really the
acts of the employer. 17 Another theory underlying the strict
vicarious liability rule is that it serves the deterrent purpose of
punitive damages by encouraging employers to carefully select
and supervise all employees. 18
Under the strict vicarious liability rule, however, an
employer who has exercised the utmost care in supervising or
hiring employees could nonetheless be liable for punitive
damages. Realizing the possibility of unjust awards under such
a rule, many courts have adopted another theory of employer
liability to assure that only those who deserve to be punished
are in fact punished. 9 Under this theory, an employer will be
liable for punitive damages only when he or a managerial
agent has actually participated 20 in a wrongful act. This theory
of employer liability was adopted by the American Law Institute and is published in the Restatement (Second) of Torts at
section 909, and in the Restatement (Second) of Agency at section 217C.21
THE LIMITED LIABILITY RULE

The rationale behind the more limited theory of employer
liability is that, since the purposes of punitive damages are
punishment and deterrence, 22 such damages should be assessed only in situations where they would accomplish those purposes.2 3 This theory attempts to take into account that there
may be situations where employers are in no way responsible
for the outrageous acts of their agents, and that to punish an
16. Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 134 P. 753, 764 (Nev. 1913). See also 5 Minzer, supra
note 2, S 40.51[3].
17. Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 134 P. 753, 764 (Nev. 1913).
18. 5 Minzer, supra note 2, S 40.51[3].
19. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d at 1125 (Wyo. 1981). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
S 909, comment b (1975).
20. See supra note 4.
21. The rule of employer liability for punitive damages was first adopted in 1939 by the
American Law Institute and was published in the Restatement. The Restatement was
not, however, the first time that the theory of limited employer liability for punitive
damages was introduced into the law. The theory has actually been applied by courts for
quite some time. Hale, in the 1912 edition of his treatise on damages, stated a rule very
similar to the Restatement's as that applicable to suits seeking punitive damages from
employers. HALE, supra note 6, S 91.
22. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d at 1125 (Wyo. 1981).

23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909, comment b
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/9
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employer in such situations would not fulfill the purposes of
punitive damages. Thus, under the Restatement,
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a
master or other principal because of an act by an agent
if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized
the doing and the manner of the act or,
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a
managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act. 4
While the Restatement rule has many advocates, it is not
without its critics. The general arguments against the rule are
laid out in Chief Justice Rose's dissenting opinion in Campen v.
Stone, where he states that the Restatement's philosophy lacks
"any logical validity in the distinction which [it] seeks to make
... between the acts of a menial versus a managerial
employee." 2 6 The Restatement theory is "flawed," according
to Chief Justice Rose, in its "assumption" that a corporation
can act willfully and wantonly only through its managerial
employees. 26
Legally speaking, the act of an agent within the scope of
his employment is the act of his principal and, thus, when an
agent commits an outrageous act, arguably the principal has
also committed an outrageous act. It is also true that a corporation can only act through its agents, and therefore the act
of each of a corporation's agents is an act of the corporation.
However, this sort of analysis misses the point. The focus in
the employer-punitive damage debate should not be on
legalistic notions of agency, but rather on practical considerations of what rule will best serve the purposes of punitive
damages.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909 (1979). The same rule is contained in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency S 217C (1958), except under the rule the phrase "or retaining" is not included in part (b).
25. 635 P.2d at 1113 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983
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It is fundamental to the doctrine of punitive damages that
their purpose is not compensatory. 27 Their purpose, rather, is
to punish the wrongdoer for his outrageous conduct, and to
deter similar conduct by others by making an example of the
wrongdoer.28 The rule of employer liability for punitive
damages should be one that accomplishes those purposes.
Since managers, directors, and officers of a business are the
ones ultimately responsible for directing the conduct of lowerlevel employees toward the general public, the rule should give
them incentive to be responsible in carrying out their duty. It
should also recognize, however, that there may be instances
where the conduct of an agent could not have been prevented,
even by the utmost care and responsibility on the part of
management, and that to award punitive damages in such a
situation would serve neither a punitive nor a deterrent function. By requiring some participation by those in control of a
business before assessing punitive damages against the
business, the Restatement rule seems to be the better rule for
carrying out the policies underlying the doctrine of punitive
damages.29
The Restatement has also been criticized as not providing
an incentive to "corporations to control the acts of their lowerlevel employees." 30 While this is a legitimate concern, this
author feels that the Restatement can be read and applied in
such a way that it will provide an incentive for all employers to
control the conduct of their lower-level employees. First of all,
part (b) of section 909 of the Restatement allows punitive
damages where the agent is unfit and the principal or a
managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining
him. 3 ' Thus, section 909(b) provides employers with an incentive to use care in choosing employees. Other parts of the
Restatement may also be read to allow punitive damages
where employers are careless in supervising or training their
employees.3 2 Later, under the heading "A Closer Look at The
27. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979). Some jurisdictions do award
punitive damages as compensation. See generally GHIARDI, supra note 1, SS 4.02-4.06.
28. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 191 (Wyo. 1979).
29. See Comment, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against An Entrepreneurfor the
Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961) (the author advocates the
Restatement Rule for the same reason).
30. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d at 1134 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909(b) (1979).
32. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Restatement", this comment will explain how some courts
have applied the Restatement rule, and will provide some suggestions as to how it might be applied to best serve the policies
of punitive damages. Before that, however, an explanation of
the basic prerequisites to an award of punitive damages is in
order.
PREREQUISITES To RECOVERING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In almost every action where punitive damages are sought,
whether it be from employers or any other defendant, two
preliminary elements must usually be established. The first is
that the conduct causing the injury be so outrageous that it
should be punished. 3 Such conduct on the part of the defendant may be that "which [is] malicious, wanton, reckless,
willful, grossly negligent, in reckless disregard of the rights of
others, or with criminal indifference to the rights of safety of
others." 34
Not all of these types of conduct, however, will be sufficient to warrant punitive damages in every jurisdiction. In
Wyoming, for example, punitive damages may not be awarded
for a defendant's "gross negligence."8 5 The defendant's conduct must be done "intentionally, maliciously, or with wanton
6
disregard for safety."
33. See generally 5 Minzer, supra note 2, S 40.20.
34. Id. at S 40.21.
35. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 191 (Wyo. 1979). In Danculovich, the court held that
"gross negligence" and "ordinary negligence" are types of conduct which vary in degree
(i.e. gross and ordinary negligence are the same =ns of conduct with "gross" constituting a greater degree of negligence). Id. "Gross negligence" and "willfil and wanton
misconduct", on the other hand, are not even the same kind of conduct. Thus, the court
held that while a plaintiffs negligence must be compared with a defendant's negligence
for purposes of reducing damages "proportionate to the degree of negligence," id. at
192, a plaintiffs negligence can not be compared with a defendant's willfil and wanton
misconduct. Id. at 194. Therefore, when a defendant's conduct is found to be willful and
wanton, comparative negligence will not be an issue in the case and the plaintiffs
damages will not be reduced due to his own negligence. Id.
36. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d at 1134 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting) (citing Hall Oil
Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 232 P. 255 (1925)). The exact degree of outrageous misconduct required beyond gross negligence in order to assess punitive damages may depend
upon the type of case in which such damages are being sought. In Danculovichv. Brown,
where the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages for wrongful death, the court held that
punitive damages could be awarded "only if the jury finds willful and wanton misconduct
on the part of the defendant." 593 P.2d at 192 (emphasis added). In Sears v. Summit,
Inc., 616 P.2d 765 (Wyo. 1980), on the other hand, where the plaintiff sought punitive
damages for trespass, the court held that such damages could be recovered "upon a showing 'that the acts, constituting the trespass, were committed with reckless disregardfor,
or a willful indifference to, the rights of the plaintiffs' ". Id. at 770 (emphasis added)
(quoting Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 237 P. at 271 (1925)). Whether the court intended there

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983
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The other prerequisite to an award of punitive damages, or
at least a prerequisite in Wyoming, is that there be proof of actual damages.37 Some jurisdictions, however, allow punitive
damages where there has been no award of compensatory
38
damages, if there has been an award of nominal damages,
and some federal courts allow punitive damages without an
39
award of either actual or nominal damages.
Although it has not reached the status of being a prerequisite to punitive damages, evidence of the defendant's
wealth should be introduced when seeking such damages. 40
The defendant's wealth is important because of the theory that
if such damages are going to serve their punitive function, the
defendant must be able to feel their impact. 4' Conversely,
evidence of the defendant's wealth is also important in
avoiding his financial ruin with an excessive award. 42 Thus, in
order to reduce the risk of having an award of punitive
damages reduced on appeal, plaintiffs will want to introduce
evidence of the defendant's wealth. 43
An additional element that must be proved before any
damages may be recovered from an employer for the act of his
agent is that the agent was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident. This point is discussed later in
this comment and therefore an explanation will be avoided
here.44
A

CLOSER LOOK AT THE RESTATEMENT

Now that a general understanding of the policies and
prerequisites of punitive damages has been established, the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

to be a difference in the manner of misconduct required to warrant punitive damages in a
wrongful death, as opposed to trespass, case is not clear. The riddle may, however, be
purely academic since it is doubtful that anyone, especially juries, even knows the difference between "gross negligence" and "outrageous misconduct" let alone the difference between "willful and wanton misconduct" and "reckless disregard".
Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Wyo. 1982).
Rushing v. Hooper - McDonald, Inc., 293 Ala. 56, 300 So.2d 94, 98 (1974).
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.D.C. 1973).
Sears v. Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d 765, 772 (Wyo. 1980).
Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Wyo. 1977).
Id.
See Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981) (the Wyoming Supreme Court mandated a bifurcated trial procedure for introducing evidence of a defendant's wealth when
punitive damages are sought).
See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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focus will shift to the specific provisions of the Restatement
rule. As previously mentioned, the Restatement rule was
adopted in Wyoming in Campen v. Stone. The question that
will probably haunt most practitioners now is how to apply the
rule. The following discussion will address, individually, each
of the four parts of section 909, with illustrations of how some
courts have applied them and with suggestions of other possible interpretations.
(a) The Principal or a Managerial Agent Authorized the Doing
and the Manner of the Act
Under section 909(a), an employer who participates in his
agent's outrageous conduct by authorizing it will be liable for
punitive damages. 45 The key elements necessary to establish
liability under section 909(a) are that an agency relationship
exist between the actor and the employer, and that the principal or a managerial agent authorize the agent's outrageous
misconduct. 46 Each of these elements will be separately
discussed below.
Agency Relationship
In order to assess punitive damages against an employer
under part (a), or any other part of section 909, it must be
shown that the one who committed the wrong was an agent of
the employer. The term "agent" includes servants and
employees but is not limited to them. 47 An agency relationship
exists when a principal intends the agent to act on his behalf
and the agent accepts with the understanding that the principal is in control of the undertaking. 48 The right of the principal to control the physical conduct of the agent is what
transforms an ordinary agent into a servant or employee. 49
The term "agent" thus includes, but is not limited to, servants
and employees. 50
In Wyoming, it is not clear whether the term "agent", as it
is used in the Restatement, will be given its broad meaning. In
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909(a) (1979).
46. Id.
47. See generally W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY S 6 (1964).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 1, comment b (1958).
49. SEAVEY, supra note 47, S 6.
50. The terms "servant" and "employee" are synonymous. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
471 (5th ed. 1979).
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Stockwell v. Morris,51 a case involving employer liability for
compensatory damages, the Wyoming Supreme Court found
the distinction between agents and servants to be important.
In Stockwell, the plaintiff sued Maytag Intermountain Company for compensatory damages when his car collided with a
car driven by one of Maytag's salesmen. The court held that,
while the salesman was undoubtedly an agent of Maytag, 52 he
was not a servant because the company did not expressly
reserve any control over the manner in which he operated his
car.5 Therefore, Maytag was not held liable for compensatory
damages because an "agent who is not at the same time acting
as a servant cannot ordinarily make his principal liable for incidental negligence ....- 4
Whether the strict line drawn in Stockwell between servants and other agents with respect to an employer's liability
for compensatory damages will be carried over to liability for
punitive damages is unanswered. In light of the theory behind
the Restatement rule, however, it makes sense to give the
word "agent" its broader meaning when assessing punitive
damages. The Restatement is founded upon a belief that it is
unjust to assess punitive damages against an employer unless
he has in some way participated in the wrongful conduct. 55 An
employer's participation in the outrageous acts of a mere
agent would seem no less culpable than his participation in the
outrageous acts of a servant. Arguably, then, the employer
should be liable in either situation.56
51. 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933).
52. Id. at 191.
53. Id. at 194. In Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978), the
employer was held liable in compensatory damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff, a
salesman for the company, when he was involved in an automobile accident while riding
in a car driven by a ses mana er for the company. The company argued that it could not
be liable for damages because the sales manager was not an "employee". Id. at 1042. The
Wyoming Supreme Court, in holding that Combined could be liable for compensatory
damages, distinguished Stockwell because in the instant case the employer had expressly
issued rules and regulations which the sales manager was required to follow while
operating his car. Id. at 1045. While the court did not rely exclusively upon the existence
of these rules and regulations in finding that the sales manager was an agent, their existence was important to the court's decision. Id. One might question the distinction the
court made between Stockwell and Combined Insurance because it would seem to
discourage rather than encourage employers to control the conduct of their agents so that
they might avoid possible liability for compensatory or punitive damages due to the torts
of their agents.
54. 22 P.2d at 191. See the Restatement (Second) of Agency S 1, comment e (1958), where it
is likewise stated that "the liability of a master for the torts of his servant is greater in extent than the liability of a principal for the torts of an agent who is not a servant."
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909, comment b (1979). See also 5 Minzer, supra
note 2, S 40.51[2], at 40-125.
56. See infra note 66 where there might be an exception for treating the term "agent" in its
broad sense.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/9

10

Barbe: Recovering Punitive Damages from Employers: The Practical Applica
681
COMMENTS

1983

ManagerialAgent Authorized the Doing and the Manner of the
Act
In order to recover punitive damages from an employer
under part (a) of section 909 it also must be shown that the
principal or a managerial agent authorized the outrageous conduct.5 7 A "principal" is generally defined as "one who has permitted or directed another to act for his benefit and subject to
his direction and control. 58 The meaning of the term "principal" is relatively straightforward and has not seemed to
cause the courts any trouble in applying the Restatement. The
term "managerial agent", on the other hand, is not so easily
defined and has been an issue in some decisions under the
Restatement.
Many courts have defined "managerial agent" differently.
One court, for example, held that "To be entitled to an award
of punitive damages against a corporation the complaining
party must show that.., its directors and managing officers
59
participated in or authorized or ratified the agent's acts."
Another court has said, "It is the nature of the authority conferred upon an agent that determines whether the agent is
employed in a managerial capacity." 6 0 But perhaps the best
test of whether an agent is a "managerial agent" for purposes
of part (a) is whether the agent is responsible for supervising
61
the acts of other employees.
As previously noted, the underlying theory of the Restatement is that an employer should not be liable for punitive
damages unless he, or a managerial agent, participated in the
misconduct. 62 The "participation" which warrants punitive
damages under part (a) of section 909 is the employer's, or
managerial agent's, authorizationof the outrageous conduct.
Since "supervisory employees" will generally be the ones
responsible for authorizing or prohibiting an employee's conduct, the term "managerial agent", as it is used in section
909(a), should be defined to include such employees.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909(a) (1979).
58. SEAVEY, supra note 47, S 3, at 4.

59. Oenshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 334, 487 P.2d 929, 932 (1971) (emphasis
60. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899, 913 (1976).
61. See Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 273 F. Supp. 870, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
62. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Whether the outrageous conduct has in fact been authorized will also be an issue under section 909(a). The obvious case
of authorization is where the agent is directed to do the
outrageous act. There are, however, other acts short of an actual directive that may constitute an authorization of the doing
and the manner of an employee's conduct. In the Colorado case
of Fitzsimmons v. Honaker, 63 for example, the employer,
Aqua Soft, which was in the business of selling water
softeners, was held liable for punitive damages when one of its
salesmen fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to sign an installment lien note upon their property. In holding that the
outrageous conduct had been authorized, the court relied on
evidence that Aqua Soft furnished its salesmen with sales
agreements which referred to them as "authorized agents" of
Aqua Soft. 64 Exactly why this constituted an authorization of
the salesman's conduct is never fully explained by the court.
However, one senses that perhaps Aqua Soft left the manner
of selling water softeners totally up to its salesmen and that
the court felt the employer should be given some incentive to
control the sales tactics of its employees. One of the criticisms
of the Restatement rule is that it fails to provide an "incentive
for corporations to control the acts of their lower-level
employees." 65 If the rule does in fact produce this result, then
the critics have a legitimate concern. However, Fitzsimmons
illustrates that there is no reason why, under the Restatement,
employers could not be liable for punitive
damages for failure
66
to control the acts of their employees.

Plaintiffs might also argue that an employer's failure to
adequately train employees assigned to perform potentially
63.
64.
65.
66.

485 P.2d 923 (Colo. 1971).
Id. at 926.
Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d at 1134 (Wyo. 1981) (&Rose, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson - Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,844 n.21 (2d Cir. 1967)(the
court suggests that widespread misconduct by subordinates might indicate
authorization). Employers should, however be able to expect that their employees will
behave in a responsible manner. Therefore, implying an authorization from an employer's
failure to control his agent's conduct should probably be limited to cases where there is a
considerable lack of control or direction by an employer. Furthermore, it would seem that
imposing punitive damages upon an employer due to his failure to control the acts of an
agent should be limited to his failure to control employees or servants rather than aU
agents. As an agency relationship moves from master-servant to principal-independent
contractor the employer has less ability to control the manner of the agent's conduct.
Therefore, an employer should not be liable for punitive damages due to his failure to control an agent who is more like an independent contractor because, by the very nature of
such an agency relationship, the employer is not able to control the details of the agent's
acts. For a discussion on when an agent might be considered a servant or independent
contractor, see F. R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY SS 432-452 (4th ed.
1952).
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dangerous tasks constitutes an authorization of the employee's
conduct. 67 In Leslie v. Jones Chemical Co., Inc., 68 punitive
damages were allowed against the defendant chemical company where there was evidence that it "had consciously and
deliberately disregarded known safety procedures regarding
the handling of chlorine cylinders. . ."69 It is not clear from
".

the court's opinion which rule of employer liability it was applying.70 The dissent, however, expressly applied the Restatement, but concluded that punitive damages could not be
assessed against the chemical company because there was no
evidence that any managerial staff had "authorized ... the

acts which led to the injury." 1 In the opinion of the dissenting
judge "the contrary [was] true because there were certain
written instructions available to employees that cautioned
' 72
them in handling chlorine gas.

An employer who has provided his employees with adequate safety instructions on potentially dangerous jobs should
not be held to have authorized the employees' wrongful conduct. Where, on the other hand, the employer has not done so,
plaintiffs might have an argument that the agent's misconduct
has been authorized. The failure to provide adequate safety instructions or the failure to see that each employee understands
and follows the instructions in connection with potentially
dangerous activities is something which society should deter.
It was explained earlier in this comment that punitive
damages may be awarded only when the act complained of was
done in an outrageous manner. 7 3 An employee who has failed
to perform in a safe manner merely because he is unaware of
the dangers or proper safety procedures of his job may only be
guilty of ordinary negligence. In such a case, the imposition of
punitive damages might seem improper. The outrageous con67. See King v. McGuff, 149 Tex. 432, 234 S.W.2d 403 (1950), and Samules v. Checker Taxi
Co. Inc., 65 Ill.
App. 3d 63, 382 N.E.2d 424 (1978), where plaintiffs lost on a similar
theory. King and Samules, however, were decided upon the grounds of inadequacy of
proof, 234 S.W.2d at 405, and defective pleadings, 382 N.E.2d at 427, respectively.
68. 92 Nev. 391, 551 P.2d 234 (1976).
69. Id. at 235.
70. Nevada appears, however, to follow the strict vicarious liability rule for punitive damages
against employers. In Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 P. 753 (1913), the
Nevada Supreme Court followed a rule of strict vicarious liability.
71. 551 P.2d at 238.
72. id.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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duct which warrants punitive damages, however, may be that
of the employer. Common sense dictates that a potentially
dangerous activity requires certain precautions to minimize
the risk. The greater the risk involved, the greater the need for
adequate precautions. When there is a gap between the risks
involved and the precautions employed there is an increased
chance of error and injury. Arguably, then, the larger the gap,
the closer the failure to provide adequate safety measures
comes to being outrageous. Thus, in a case where an authorization is implied from a lack of adequate safety instructions, the
outrageous conduct that supports the award of punitive
damages may not be that of the employee who directly caused
the injury, but rather that of the employer who failed to
minimize the risks of injury.
(b) The Agent Was Unfit and the Principal or a Managerial
74
Agent Was Reckless in Employing or Retaining Him
Part (a) of section 909, which was discussed above, allows
punitive damages against an employer who has authorized the
agent's outrageous misconduct. Part (b) of section 909, which
will now be discussed, provides another basis upon which such
damages may be awarded-where the employer, or his
managerial agent, recklessly hires or retains the agent who
committed the outrageous act.76 The typical cases under section 909(b) are those where the employer hires or retains an
agent whom he knows is unfit for the job. For example, in
Hayes v. State76 punitive damages were allowed against the
State of New York when an intoxicated employee at Brooklyn
State Hospital assaulted one of the patients. The employee had
a history of alcoholism of which hospital officials were aware
before he was hired, as well as a history of intoxication and
asocial behavior at the hospital.77 The New York Court of
Claims held that the hospital might not have been liable for
punitive damages if the employee had been hired to work in
nonpatient areas, but hiring him to work in sensitive patient
78
care areas, with full knowledge of his problem, was reckless.
74. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY J 217C (1957) sets forth substantially the same
rule as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909 (1979) except that part b of the Agency
rule does not contain the phrase "or retaining".
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909(b) (1979).
76. 80 Misc. 2d 498, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1975).
77. Id., 363 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
78. Id. at 998.
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Punitive damages have also been awarded under section
909(b) for an employer's recklessness in failing to assure the
fitness of its employees. In Wilson N. Jones MemorialHospital
v. Davis7 9 the plaintiff, while a patient at the hospital, was injured when one of the orderlies attempted to remove a Foley
catheter without first deflating the balloon. The hospital's normal hiring procedure was to get four employment references
and three personal references, and to check at least one personal and one employment reference. 80 In the case of the
orderly, however, the court found the hospital's reference
checks to be less than adequate. As a prior medical employment reference, the orderly listed eight months served as a
medical corpsman in the United States Navy, a reference
which the hospital failed to check. The evidence showed that
had they inquired they would have discovered that the orderly
was expelled from the Navy Medical Corps School after only a
month of training and that he had a serious drug problem as
well as a criminal record. 8' Thus, the court held that in hiring
the orderly, the hospital had shown an entire want of care and
conscious indifference to the rights, welfare and safety of the
82
patients, and therefore would be liable for punitive damages.
The court's holding in Wilson is notable for another point.
There the orderly who caused the injury was guilty only of
ordinary negligence, yet punitive damages were allowed
against the employer. 83 Normally, punitive damages may not
be awarded for mere negligence. 8 4 The Wilson court expressly
applied section 909(b) but did not explain how punitive
damages could be assessed where the agent's conduct is
553 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 183. The rule in Wilson (i.e. assessing punitive damages against an employer for his
failure to assure the fitness of an employee) should probably be limited to situations
where the employee's special skills are important to safely carry out the tasks he is
employed to perform. For example, a hospital's failure to take reasonable steps in assuring that its new doctors are qualified to practice medicine might be a proper case for the
Wilson rule. But a construction company's failure to discover that its new employee lost
his last job because he assaulted a co-employee might not be a proper case for the Wilson
rule. Employers should be expected to take reasonable steps to see that those they hire
are adequately qualified to safely perform their jobs, but they should not be charged with
being personal investigators of each employee they propose to hire.
83. Id. at 180. See also Go Int'l, Inc. v. Lewis, 601 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
(punitive damages awarded against an employer for being reckless in employing or retaining an unfit employee where the employee's acts were found only to constitute ordinary negligence).
84. See supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text.

79.
80.
81.
82.
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merely negligent. The result reached by the court, however,
seems logically consistent with the policy behind the Restatement.
The focus of the Restatement is directed more toward the
acts of the employer than the employee, with the intent that
employers will not be liable for punitive damages unless their
own conduct warrants it.85 Section 909(b) imposes liability
upon an employer for punitive damages when he is reckless in
employing or retaining an unfit agent. Thus, an employer who
is liable under section 909(b) is liable not because of his agent's
acts, but rather because of his own outrageous conduct. It
would seem consistent, then, with the policy of the Restatement to award punitive damages based on an assessment of an
employer's conduct, rather than his employee's.
(c) The Agent Was Employed in a Managerial Capacity and
Was Acting in the Scope of Employment
Section 909(c) of the Restatement seems equivalent to the
strict vicarious liability rule mentioned earlier,86 except that
here the scope of liability is limited to the acts of managerial
agents. Basically, under section 909(c), an employer may be
liable for punitive damages whenever an agent acting in a
managerial capacity commits an outrageous act."' The key
elements necessary to impose liability upon an employer under
section 909(c) are "managerial capacity" and "scope of
employment".
ManagerialCapacity
The best test for determining "managerial capacity"
under section 909(c) might be to look at the degree of discretion the agent is allowed to exercise.88 When an agent is given
85. See supra notes 22, 23 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
87. See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1968) (no authorization of the manager's acts need be shown).
88. Earlier, in conjunction with the discussion of section 909(a), it was suggested that the
term "managerial agent" should be defined to include "supervisory employees". See
supra note 61 and accompanying text. Under section 909(a), punitive damages may be
assessed against an employer where he or a "managerial agent" authorizes the
outrageous act. Because "supervisory employees" will often be the ones immediately
responsible for prohibiting or authorizing the acts of lower level employees, it was suggested that "supervisory employees" be included as managerial agents under section
909(a). Under section 909(c), however, a different definition is suggested for the term
"managerial capacity" because under section 909(c) it is the managerial agent's own conduct that makes the employer liable for punitive damages, rather than his authorizingthe
misconduct of another.
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discretion, he becomes more responsible for directing the conduct of the business toward the general public, and consequently his position in the business becomes more important.
The Restatement authors espouse a rule of strict vicarious
liability for agents in managerial capacities with the hope of
deterring "the employment of unfit persons for important
positions." 89 Thus, in keeping with the policy of the Restatement, whether an agent is employed in a managerial capacity
should, perhaps, be a function of his importance in the business
which is a natural result of the discretion he is allowed.
The California Supreme Court adopted such a test in Egan
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. 90 There the plaintiff sued
Mutual of Omaha for breach of his disability insurance policy
when two of Mutual's adjusters, claiming that plaintiff was
merely sick and not disabled, refused to pay his disability
benefits. Mutual of Omaha argued that it could not be held
liable for punitive damages under section 909(c) because the
adjusters were not involved in "high-level policy making", and
thus could not be deemed managerial agents.9 1 The court,
however, found the adjusters to be managerial agents, stating
that "the critical inquiry is the degree of discretion the
employees possess in making decisions that will utlimately
92
determine corporate policy."

While defining "managerial agent" in terms of the discretion bestowed upon an agent may be consistent with the
Restatement's theory of deterring "the employment of unfit
persons for important positions," the question of employer
liability for punitive damages under part (c) should not stop
there. Employers 93 should be able to expect that those in
whom they vest discretionary power will exercise it in a
responsible manner. Therefore, it may be improper to assess
punitive damages against an employer merely because he has
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909, comment b (1979).
90. 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 598 P.2d 452 (1979).
91. Id., 598 P.2d at 459.
92. Id. Section 909(c) has also been applied to hold employers liable in punitive damages for
the outrageous acts of their franchisees, Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21 Cal. App. 3d
541, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1971), and independent contractor agents, Pedernales Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Schultz, 583 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
93. In the case of a corporation the term "employer", as it is used here, is synonymous with
officers, directors and upper-level managers. These persons are responsible for
delegating power within the corporation and thus their irresponsibility in making such
delegations should be deterred by imposing punitive damages upon the corporation.
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given one of his agents discretionary power. Perhaps punitive
damages should be assessed under part (c) of the Restatement
only where the employer has been careless in hiring, retaining
or placing the agent in a managerial position. 94 Putting an
employer who has been reasonable in delegating discretionary
power to an agent, but whose agent has abused that power, on
the same footing with an employer who has been unreasonable
in his delegation, would not serve to deter the employment of
unfit persons for important positions. If such a purpose is going to be accomplished, the rule must distinguish between the
two situations.
Scope of Employment
Section 909(c) also requires that an act be done "in the
scope of the agent's employment" before punitive damages
96
may be assessed against the employer.9 5 In Beard v. Brown,
the Wyoming Supreme Court stated,
Before an employee may he held to be acting within the
scope of his employment, it must be demonstrated that
the activity is (1) activated in part by a purpose to serve
the employer; (2) done with the intention to perform it
as a part of or incident to a service on account of which
the employee is employed; and (3) performed to further
the business interests of the employer in some part.97
The purpose of the employee's acts, however, need not be
solely to serve the employer. "The rule is that one will be held
to be within the scope of his employment when the employee is
engaged in an activity which has a multiple purpose, and it is
sufficient that one of the purposes is employment-related." 98
The factors that seem to have some bearing on the issue of
scope of employment are whether the agent is performing the
kind of act he was employed to perform, whether the act was
accomplished during a time reasonably connected with the
94. Requiring some fault on the part of the employer before assessing punitive damages
against him for the acts of a managerial agent is in conflict with comment (b) to section
909 which states that punitive damages may be assessed against an employer for the
outrageous act of a managerial agent "[a]lthough there has been no fault on the part of
[the] corporation or other employer .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909, comment b (1979).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909(c) (1979).
96: 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980).
97. Id. at 735.
98. Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Wyo. 1978).
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authorized period of employment, and whether it was accomplished in an area or locality not unreasonably distant from
the area authorized for performance of the employment. 99
It is also generally recognized that an agent's intentional,
reckless, or malicious acts will not, standing alone, take his
conduct beyond the scope of employment. 10 0 Likewise, it has
been held that an agent's disregard of an employer's instructions or performance of his duties in a manner prohibited or
even expressly forbidden by the employer will not, taken
alone, remove the agent's acts from the scope of
employment. 10 1
While such conduct might not remove the agent's acts
from the scope of employment for purposes of assessing compensatory damages against an employer, they should be considered in assessing punitive damages. The policy of the
Restatement is that punitive damages should not be assessed
against an employer unless he has participated in the
outrageous conduct. Where an employer has forbidden the
agent's conduct or given instructions contrary to the agent's
actual conduct, he has not participated in the agent's acts, but
and therefore should not be
rather has done just the opposite,
102
liable for punitive damages.
(d) The Principal or a Managerial Agent of the Principal
Ratified or Approved the Act
Under the final part of the Restatement provision, section
909(d), an employer will be liable for punitive damages for his
after-the-fact participation in his agent's outrageous
conduct.108 The obvious case under section 909(d) is where the
employer expressly ratifies or approves the agent's conduct.
Thus, in illustration number two in the comments to section
99. Gill v. Schaap, 601 P.2d 545, 547 (Wyo. 1979). See Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo.
1980). "The mere fact that an employee is remunerated or paid by employers for time
traveling to and from work does not place that employee within the 'scope-ofemployment' rule." Id. at 736.
100. See Sage Club v. Hunt, 638 P.2d 161,162 (Wyo. 1981); PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 70 (4th
ed. 1971).
101. PROSSER, supra note 100.
102. An argument that the employer participated in the conduct might be made where there is
evidence that he knows the forbidden act is being done or that his instructions are being
disregarded. See supra note 66.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 909(d) (1979).
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909, it is stated that A, the owner of a theatre, could be liable
for punitive damages when he expressed his approval upon
learning that a special officer employed to keep order cruelly
abused a small boy while ejecting him from the theater. An
employer's ratification or approval may also be implied in some
situations. For instance, in Hale v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,10 4 an insurance company was held liable for punitive
damages on the theory that it had ratified its agent's wrongful
refusal to pay the plaintiff insurance benefits when, after having an opportunity to learn of the facts, it also failed to pay the
benefits.10 5
While the employer's mere failure to dismiss an employee
who has committed an outrageous act will not generally constitute an approval of his conduct for purposes of section
909(d), 10 6 retaining the employee together with some other act
of approval may constitute a ratification. In Safeway Stores v.
Gibson,10 for example, where the plaintiff was seeking
punitive damages for false arrest, the court held that evidence
of the defendant's retaining the security guard who made the
arrest in conjunction with statements by the corporate officers
to the guard that he "did right", was sufficient evidence to
08
raise a question of ratification for the jury.
An employer's attempt to enforce a contract entered into
by his agent has also been held to constitute a ratification of
the agent's outrageous conduct. In Security Aluminum Window ManufacturingCorp. v. Lehman Associates, Inc., 0 9 a real
estate agent working for Lehman Associates induced the
plaintiff to sell some property to Minkowitz, a friend of the
agent's, at a price only half that of the highest bid. When the
plaintiff learned of the fraud he instituted an action seeking injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages
from Lehman Associates. Lehman countersued for commis104. 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1975).
105. Id., 117 Cal. Rptr. at 154. See also Farvour v. Geltis, 91 Cal. App. 2d 603, 205 P.2d 424,
425 (1949) (employer held to have impliedly ratified his agent's acts through his inaction).
106. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d at 1126 (Wyo. 1981).
107. 118 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1955).
108. Id. at 389. See Hardman v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250-51
(1977) (a lack of any evidence that the employee was discharged or even reprimanded was
some evidence of the employer's approval of the conduct). See also McChristian v. Popkin,
75 Cal. App. 2d 249, 171 P.2d 85 (1946).
109. 108 N.J. Super. 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1969).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/9

20

Barbe: Recovering Punitive Damages from Employers: The Practical Applica

1983

COMMENTS

691-

sions due on the sale by plaintiff to Minkowitz. 110 The Supreme
Court of New York held that Lehman could be liable for
punitive damages on the theory that it had ratified the agent's
acts when it filed a counterclaim seeking to enforce the agent's
commission agreement.",
While a principal will normally be liable for his agent's
wrongs only when they are committed in the scope of employment, it has been held that the principal's ratification of an
agent's acts done outside of his scope of employment will make
him liable for those acts. In Henry v. Carpenter,"2 an agent of
National Trailer Inc. assaulted the plaintiff, a former employee
of National, and recovered from him a check which had
previously been issued to the plaintiff by National. Upon
recovering the check, the agent delivered it to the treasurer11of3
National, who accepted and retained it for the corporation.
National argued, and the court agreed, that the agent had
acted outside of his scope of employment in recovering the
check, but National was nonetheless held liable for punitive
damages on the theory that it had ratified the agent's wrongful
acts when it accepted the benefits of14those acts with full
knowledge of their outrageous nature.'
A common thread running through ratification cases is
that the employer had knowledge, or could have easily learned
of the outrageous nature of the agent's misconduct. When
punitive damages are sought from an employer on a theory of
ratification, some knowledge on his part should be established
before such damages may be assessed. Employers should be
able to expect that their agents will not behave oppressively in
conducting their business. Therefore, an employer's mere attempt to enforce an agent's contracts or to retain the benefits
of an agent's acts or to fail to repudiate or remedy an agent's
acts should not, without some evidence that the employer
knew or should have known of the outrageous nature of the
agent's acts, constitute a ratification which makes the
employer liable for punitive damages.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id., 260 A.2d at 250.
Id. at 254.
366 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1961).
Id. at 930.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of punitive damages should be to
punish wrongdoers, with the hope of deterring similar conduct
by others. Therefore, regardless of the deterrent effect hoped
to be gained through an award of punitive damages, they
should not be assessed unless the party against whom they are
levied is responsible for the conduct or could have prevented it.
The Restatement rule provides the best means of carrying out
the policy of punitive damages with respect to employers. As
illustrated in this comment, the Restatement rule is flexible
and can be molded to serve the purposes of punitive damages
under varying circumstances.
J. KENNETH BARBE
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